

*Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Development: Related Much?*

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## **Abstract**

This descriptive study seeks to identify the level of influence that authoritarian regimes have on development with countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The question behind this study is important in that not much is known about the autocratic countries within these regions though many of these countries have experienced much economic success in spite of difference in authoritarian regimes, and the threat of the resource curse. The data I have gathered focuses on observing variables such as GDP per capita (PPP), GDP annual growth, life expectancy index as well as the human development index which are observed within the autocracies present within the MENA. These variables are then tested to find correlations linking a country's performance to the type of authoritarian regime it possesses.

## **Chapter One: Introduction**

Numerous studies such as those by Almas Heshmati and Nam-Seok Kim, Carlos Pereira and Vladimir Teles along with many others have linked democracy to greater economic development (Heshmati & Kim 2017, Pereira & Teles 2016). Though these studies may predict that because of this many countries may consider democratization, the reality is that over 40% of the population is ruled by authoritarian regimes with a high proportion of these being in the Middle East and North Africa (Freedom House 2014). These countries, though they differ in regime types from other nations, perform quite well economically. For example, countries in Middle East such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have surpassed the United States GDP per capita of \$59,500. The United Arab Emirates GDP is over \$67,700 and Qatar's GDP per capita at \$124,500, more than twice the GDP of the United States (CIA Factbook, 2018).

While these statistics show that countries under authoritarian rule can thrive economically, it is also important to note that some of these countries are oil-producing nations, and as a result have accumulated much wealth from this resource. However what should also be considered is that there are also countries that surround those previously mentioned that do not experience the same economic success even if they were to possess oil or experience the same regime type. What I am seeking to observe within my research is whether there are authoritarian regimes that are better suited than others on account of not only their resources but also their structure.

The countries that I am observing are autocracies in the MENA region that have experienced high and low factors of economic and social development, at times on account of being more or less authoritarian. The regime types of these nations are recognized as military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships, and theocracies. And because each type presents a different level of authoritarianism, I would need to compare the different factors that comprise each type of autocracy and observe whether these attributes affect the factors of one's economic and social development.

This leads me to my research question: Does the nature of different authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North-African (MENA) shape the extent of their economic development? My question involves observing the leadership of autocratic regimes and whether some autocracies in comparison to some others have a more promising effect on the economy within Middle Eastern/North African countries.

With  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the world's population residing in these regimes, there is a reason as to why leaders of countries choose this approach over others regardless of the risks, downfalls, and the resource curse that pursuing this regime type poses (Freedom House 2014).

The research I will perform in response to this question will be significant in that it is essential to understand how authoritarian regimes within these regions achieve and manage their economical means. Their policies not only affect the  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the population that live there, but also the  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the population that may reside in countries in where trade is conducted, international peace relations have taken place, resources are/could be shared, and much more.

## **Chapter Two:Literature Background**

### **2.1 Maintaining Power**

When a leader comes into power, his main goal is to maintain his power. To do this, he needs a winning coalition. Not only is the winning coalition important for obtaining power initially, but also maintaining power. Bueno de Mesquita, et al. states in their book *The Logic of Political Survival* that a winning coalition is essential for a leader to maintain a position of power and if a leader wishes to ensure this, then he must deliver private payouts to the each of the members. However, this is ideal for an authoritarian regime where the winning coalition is not as big. If the winning coalition tends to contain too many members to deliver payouts, the leader then focuses on obtaining public goods, though this mostly occurs in democracies. In relation to this, the book addresses that it is important to keep the winning coalition small because the more members you have of your winning coalition, the more costs you have to bear. Moreover, political leaders desire to maximize their control over policy choices through their position, but acquiring power can be costly, therefore a leader must minimize costs by having the smallest winning coalition necessary (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003).

This leads me to key elements to consider that might differ depending on regime. For example, consider the number of leaders in power, meaning whether there is only one person or a group leading. Another thing is that there are different authoritarian regimes that allow more than one individual to be serve in leadership such as single-party dictatorships or military juntas, and because there are more interests to be considered due to more people in power, there might potentially be more costs involved as well.

## **2.2 Obtaining Power**

While the main goal of a leader is to maintain his power, he may face trouble in doing so whether that is because of not maintaining the satisfaction of his winning coalition or adopting policies that hurt the economy. These policies can be rent-seeking in which the leader use to pay his winning coalition, however if the economy has been dramatically affected by a leader's policies, he may be unable to pay his winning coalition.

As a result of not performing well in these areas, a leader's power might be threatened by the presence of a potential challenger (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003). Bueno de Mesquita, et al. states that for some leaders, the challenger is not much of a threat because becoming a challenger poses its difficulties as well. They recognize these challenges as part of Challenger's Dilemma because a challenger needs to win over members of the current leader's coalition, however the challenger faces problems with producing credibility (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003). Members of the current leader's winning coalition are currently receiving payouts and if the leader stays in office, they are guaranteed to keep receiving these benefits so long as they are a member of his winning coalition. In addition to this, because there is no guarantee that challenger would win, many individuals of a winning coalition are less likely to defect. This is on account of the fact that becoming a part of the challenger's coalition would be too much of a risk (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003). This is important in that if we are observing the structure of authoritarian regimes and how it affects economic development then we need to know about threats that can

affect the regime such as the Challenger's Dilemma which can influence the economy due to transitions of power.

Something to consider with the Challenger's Dilemma is that a political group can not only take on the role of leadership, but also that of a challenger as well. In *The Logic of Political Survival*, the Challenger's Dilemma is portrayed as an image of one individual trying to win the likes of many, but as previously aforementioned, individuals can rule as one political body, and if there is more than one challenger to the current leader (meaning if there are many individuals serving as the challenger but in the form of one political group), then there are more individuals to be considered within this concept. Secondly, one must consider that the political group as a challenger might be able to convince members to defect simply by its accompaniments. For example, a military regime is comprised of militia and while the nature of this regime might not be able to get individuals to defect because of its lack credibility, perhaps they can do so with their use of force. To note, some members are going to want to defect regardless of the risk of not being in the winning coalition. Everyone who may be currently in the winning coalition might not agree with the agenda or policies of the current leader, and because they do not agree, they might defect to a challenger in which they do support or any challenger so long as they are not under current leader anymore. This of course would be of their own volition and not because the challenger was proven credible. Some members are quite passionate about seeing their government under the right leadership. And although this rarely occurs due to costs, some are more willing to risk everything to allow change to occur, even if it means being disloyal to their current leader. This consequently affects



economic development in that leaders help shape the economic policies, however if there is threat in leadership then there is a possibility that a regime's economic policies could experience change with new leadership. This could later be expressed through the data.

### **2.3 Economic Development and Institutions**

Vollmer defines development as "a whole depends on each individual's capabilities" (Vollmer 2009). And he also states that capabilities define the freedom to choose a valuable life in accordance with individual preferences" (Vollmer 2009). This is to say that economic development could mean that an individual has the capability to choose a valuable life in accordance to one's preferences as a product of one's economy (Vollmer 2009). Vollmer's research relates economic development with an institution's ability to contribute to human development, and addresses how democracies are ideal for providing things that contribute to human development such as education, healthcare, welfare provisions, etc. on account of the demands of their constitutions (Vollmer 2009). Democracies have a constitutional responsibility to redistribute their wealth in order to fulfill these roles and this might disadvantage them when their economies are not performing as well (Vollmer 2009). He also references the Lee Hypothesis which states that authoritarian regimes are more adept to target failures within the economy as well as creating growth on account of their economic policies because they do not hold any responsibility to their constituents (Vollmer 2009). This can be vital because at times countries might need flexibility to exercise actions within their policies as a way of attacking issues faced within their economy.

While it is true that providing these things as a form of public goods can serve as investment in the citizens which can generate growth within the economy because citizens feel more inclined to work for a government that works for them, it is also true that these provisions are costly. At times, it may not be possible to supply these things or a country might need to stop the provision for a time being to rectify issues within its economy. A regime cannot do that if they are bound by a constitution to take care of the welfare of the people.

After reading Vollmer, while some countries within my study might hold some validity to the Lee Hypothesis because they are performing well due to the nature of their regime, there are some countries of my study that are not performing well. This brings up the observation that just because the nature of the regime may allow it to be efficient in combating the economic issues, does not mean the systems of the countries within this regime are efficient in themselves to take on this role. In addition to this, some of the countries within my study are providing things that democracies are only expected to be efficient in supplying as well as improving conditions to better their economy. As a result, the progress of these countries should be monitored in human development as well as in economic development. This may serve as a counterargument to Vollmer and as an implication for countries such as these in the future.

From the previous article, Vollmer illustrates what economic development can be recognized as, and Dobler builds on that concept by implying that the one can observe the strength of a regime based on the developments a country has exhibited as a result of its economy. From *The Logic of Political Survival*, we learn that leaders desire to stay in

power and they look for ways to preserve it. Challengers may not only arise on account of dissatisfaction with misguidance on certain political issues, but also lack of private goods and dissatisfaction with the use of resources, labor, and capital of a country. These things have a great influence on how a country might perform within and on account of its economy.

Dobler discusses that some countries within the MENA region may vary within their economic performances (Dobler 2011). By referencing the World Bank's classification of these countries into three groups: (RPLA; resource-poor, labor abundant economies, RRLA; resource-rich, labor-abundant economies, and RRLI; resource-rich, labor importing countries), Dobler is able to illustrate how some countries of the MENA region may be more adept or more disadvantaged with their economy because they are in lacking or abundance of natural or easily extractable resources (Dobler 2011). Thus, this affects how they are able to develop their country because of more or less money being circulated within their economy.

Dobler also addresses how after the Great Depression of the 1930s, a development model was enforced in the MENA countries which involved observing a country's ability to provide things such as education, housing, healthcare, food subsidies, physical capital accumulations, social security and public investments, etc., as a way of monitoring a country's economic performance based on its ability to develop these things (Dobler 2011). In addition to this, birth rate, death rate, school enrollment rate

and productivity rate were also observed because a country's economy depends on the individuals being healthy, skilled, and productive in order to run as efficiently as possible (Dobler 2011).

This information on economic development can be useful within my assessment of defining variables of economic development such as education, welfare provisions, housing, productivity rates, etc. However, what Dobler's literature does not address is that when studying authoritarian regimes, some of these countries often do not provide things such as these because they can be regarded as public goods, and public goods are costly and at times unattainable. In addition to this, providing these things to individuals may require management which may result in a leader becoming less sovereign because of their inability to oversee all functions of their government. Although some of the countries within my study have delegated powers to another individual such as a prime minister, it is essential to consider that not all of them have done this because the way their regime is structured can affect results of their economic development.

In the previous literature, Dobler implicitly mentions that some countries might be better off than others such as a country who is RRLA (resource rich, labor abundant), for example Iran (Dobler 2011). As a result of having resources and being abundance in labor, Dobler assumes that a country might be able to increase things such as productivity rate which would serve as a factor of economic development (Dobler 2011). However, in "Economic Development and Vulnerabilities", the authors assert that although Iran has shown an abundance in oil reserves, many Iranians themselves do not think that they will

be able to keep up the production rate because they do not have the technologies or the capital to create recovery programs to sustain production (Crane et al. 2008).

Now, oil is a main export of many of the countries involved within my study, and a lot of these countries generate their wealth on account of this main export. This scenario exhibits that when there are problems within the main export, it leads to problems within the wealth of the country (Crane et al. 2008). And if there are problems with the wealth, there will be problems in generating anything in regard to education, health, public investment, and much more because wealth is needed to produce these things. For this reason, economic policies of a country should be considered when evaluating economic development (Crane et al. 2008). Being that with having a main export it can generate wealth, though complications may arise. Therefore, a country might strive to be more efficient in its policies to accommodate. This could mean developing policies concerning the elimination of privatization, FDI, trade, regulatory policies, increasing exchange rates, etc.

With this prospective, it is important realize that although countries have discrepancies within their economies such as not being able to maintain productivity rates, lack of resources, lack of capital, etc., many of these countries are not willing to collaborate with other countries within the MENA region to meet their needs (Crane et al. 2008). This could be on account of the security dilemma, concerns with maintaining their sovereignty, and at times maintaining absolute gains of resources, capital, as well as many other things. Although there are some countries who recognize that maintaining all of their sovereignty and obtaining absolute gains may not be the best scenario for their

countries such as members of the GCC (Gulf Countries Council), there are many who do and as a result their economic policies involving trade, exchange rate, FDI, etc. are considered to be more protectionist. This can also lead to a deficiency in economic development within these countries in this region on account of more competition for jobs, resources, and labor which can actually lead to a decrease in things production rate (issues with supply and demand), welfare provisions, birth/death rates, and much more. Not only could it decrease these things previously aforementioned, but it could also provide an increase in unemployment rates, inflation rates, income distribution, poverty level, and national debt as well as other things that negatively affect the economic development of a country. Lastly to add, these negatives effects can attract challenges to a leader's power such as opposition from challenger and even threats of a regime breakdown.

As previously mentioned, the MENA region has an uneven distribution of wealth and resources. While some countries are rich and looking to expand, others are on their last leg. Luciani states in his book *Combining Economic Development in MENA* that to rectify problems such as this we must stabilize the political systems, however to stabilize the political systems, it would require a regional effort from all countries within the MENA region to move towards economic integration (Luciani 2017). Integrating the economies would require liberating economic policies, establishing trade relations, exchanging resources, sharing wealth, etc. Allowing for these policies to take place would allow for resources and wealth to be more evenly distributed which can only seek to improve efficiency of production. This can allow for countries to remedy their political

system, i.e., reevaluate their redistribution policies to where they can now provide things for their citizens such as welfare provisions, healthcare, education, and so much more. Hence, it serves as economic investments that contribute to more development (Luciani 2017). These provisions can lead to workers being healthier and more skilled which can lead to efficiency, and an increase production rates which can better one's economy. This is not to say that one can expect a democratic peace between authoritarian regimes, but that there can be efforts made that can make conditions be a bit better than they are currently.

One of the drawbacks to Luciani's research which he also addresses is that some countries are more permissive of this than others. Some countries are in the position to try policies such as these out because they can afford to be in a position where they can sustain their economies if it does not work out as planned (Luciani 2017). Not all countries within this region are as politically permissive as others are. Consider the situation where a country only has a limited amount of resources, but economic integration policies require it to share its resources or to pay taxes on imports/exports when the country does not have much money to begin with. That country has everything to lose. As a result, the country might be more protectionist. Although the demand for resources and wealth continues to grow and becomes more desperate every day for countries within this region, some countries may never be comfortable taking that risk, so that reasoning must kept in mind because the way these countries redistribute wealth and resources, regard power, manage imports and exports etc., are going to be in accordance to its logic.

## **2.4 Factors that Influence Regime Survival**

In considering the economic growth of autocratic countries in the MENA region, we should recognize that many of these countries are oil-producing countries, and they generate wealth on account of that. And according to research by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz in *Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival*, if an autocratic oil-producing country experiences great wealth then not only is the leader able to buy support and repress domestic unrest, but also able to suppress opposition from challengers that could potentially lead to his ousting (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz 2013). More specifically with the income coming in from the oil, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz state that the leader can utilize some of the wealth to purchase a better military for enforcement of policies making it to where there would less likely be chance for revolt or competition against the government due to the risk of punishment (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz 2013). These policies can be beneficial and detrimental to a country's economic performance in that tools needed can be costly which is less wealth contributed to one's economy though these influences can result in the compliance of citizens. However, the authors assert that for countries to be able to do this, they need to be rent-seeking countries meaning that the wealth is not distributed directly to the creation of more wealth, therefore leaders are able to manipulate the distribution of the wealth. This can help autocratic oil-producing countries to prolong the survival of their regime because they are able to prevent potential threats to a leader's power from occurring.

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's research is limited in that it only applies autocratic rent-seeking countries. However there are many countries that are autocratic within the



MENA region that cannot be rent-seeking because the type of authoritarian regime they have holds them constitutionally responsible for their distribution of wealth such as the constitutional monarchies in Bahrain and Jordan. These autocratic countries can be quite wealthy, for example the United Arab Emirates. But because government types that exercise quasi-democratic institutions might impose limitations that require them to share the distribution wealth throughout their country, they may not be able to manipulate the distribution of wealth to ensure the longevity of their regime.

In addition to this, due to quite a few authoritarian regimes delegating power to councils or prime ministers as well as allowing things such as elections to take place, many are wondering if the MENA region is seeking to democratize itself. Ehteshami references *Norton's Civil Society in the Middle East* to state that although there are some countries that are seeking to liberalize their economies, impose limitations on their power, and perhaps join institutions, it does not mean that they are wholeheartedly ready to change their entire political systems (Ehteshami 1999). He uses the term quasi-democratic meaning of a partial democracy to describe their behavior. Ehteshami makes that argument that although some of these countries are giving the impression that they are delegating some freedoms to the public such as the ability to participate in free elections, these leaders of these political systems still hold full control over these political practices (Ehteshami 1999).

While these tactics might be part of a political ruse to give the impression of the government's interest in the well-being of a citizen to create economic development, this can lead to actual systemic transformation, for example “redirection in politics, economy,

and even policy which can be a positive effect on the political systems and the economy”(Ehteshami 1999). Last, but not least, though there might be efforts to establish quasi-democracies with the MENA region for bettering economic conditions, there are also efforts from other countries within the MENA region to stop the progression of the democratization (Ehteshami 1999).

The author states that there are some autocratic countries who want to maintain an authoritarian regime and things such as liberalizing economies, pushing for trade relations, joining institutions, sharing resources etc. might impose on the direction leaders might want to point their country in. Moreover, Ehteshami mentions that some autocratic countries with the MENA region might actually want other countries to start the process of democratization so that they can have the opportunity to take over the regime once it breaks down because of premature actions (Ehteshami 1999). This might be due to the fact that democratization has not been proven very easy to implement within authoritarian regimes, mostly because democracies take time, resources, and implementation of policies that authoritarian regimes have not exercised prior. To go into the process without proper assessment could not only jeopardize a country's economy, but also a the survival of the country's regime.

Ehteshami also asserts that while some countries might be only using policies of democracy as part of a sham to improve economies, there are many forces that are trying to keep the MENA region as authoritarian as possible (Ehteshami 1999). What his research fails to mention is whether or not the countries that are democratizing and

pushing for liberalization are important influential countries within the MENA region such as the UAE, Qatar, Oman, etc. These countries are members of OPEC and they have access to many resources and much wealth. The MENA region in itself does not have an even distribution of these things throughout its region, therefore it is important to take note that if these influential countries are pushing for other countries to implement these policies because lesser known countries within the MENA region whose economies are suffering might not be able to avoid their advances. One must also take note of whether the countries who are advocating for the entire region to remain authoritarian are any of the influential members. If these countries are not any of the influential countries such as thriving members of OPEC that other countries might have to defer to in order to keep their economies going, then their actions might not have as great of an impact as anticipated. Last, but not least, by creating the illusion of implementing certain quasi-democratic policies, it has led to certain developments in a country's politics, but one must consider that a country might have been moving in that direction all along and that the implementation of certain policies might have simply been a happenstance instead of a byproduct of policy change.

## **2.5 Regime Breakdowns and Transitions**

Due to poor economic choices, opposition in leadership, and competition from challengers, sometimes regime transitions/breakdowns are inevitable. And because leaders are aware of this, they try to manipulate their situation before it occurs. Within her article *Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set*, Geddes states when leaders are facing a regime breakdown or transition, they might frame their

policies a certain way to help better their potential post-ouster fate while in office (Geddes 2014). The whole goal as an authoritarian leader is not only to maintain political survival, but also make a plan of their own survival because with transition or regime breakdown, chances are that one could face imprisonment, exile, or even death depending on the preference of your challenger (Geddes 2014). Geddes asserts that even though many autocracies have the capacity to fail, military dictatorships have proven to have highest of failure rates, while monarchies have the lowest (Geddes 2014). This could be due to military dictatorships' preference to hold onto as much power as they possibly can (relative gains) which makes them more likely to negotiate. Their ability to negotiate can allow for their exits and their approaches to be less violent which would make it easier to democratize or experience a regime breakdown (Geddes 2014). However with monarchies, they are the least likely to experience regime transition or breakdowns because they do not depend on election or coalition to institute their leaders.

This is essential in that if countries are not performing well in these areas to where the regime breakdowns or transitions, one's economy and/or economic development can either benefit or suffer. With new leaders, there is a possibility that the leadership could result in a different regime for the country as well as different political and economic policies (redistributive or non-distributive policies of wealth).

### **Chapter Three: Hypotheses**

In *Is The Middle East Democratizing*, Ehteshami discusses how some regimes within the MENA region have started exercising quasi-democratic institutions. These institutions in themselves are mere imitations of democratic structures that exercise policies expected to help improve economic conditions on account of their nature. These policies can be as simple as allowing the public the opportunity to participate in free elections and as complex as delegating power to others officials such as a prime minister or a council to exercise a constraint on a leader's power. Implementing these policies can help with development in that they allow citizens to be more involved with the shaping of their government or at least create this illusion because citizens are more willing to be compliant in a government where they feel they are being represented. However because the policies are only quasi-democratic, meaning they only exercise partly as a democracy, the leader still holds majority of the power and does not have the same limitations on his power as a democratic leader would have. This concept paired with the Lee Hypothesis mentioned within Vollmer's *Political Institutions and Human Development* leads me to my first hypothesis.

**Hypothesis #1: Autocratic regimes of countries within the MENA region that exercise quasi-democratic institutions experience greater economic growth and development.**

The Lee Hypothesis is a theory that states authoritarian regimes are more capable of targeting and rectifying issues of their economic system than democracies because they are not bounded by constraints. For example, the power of democratic leaders is

limited on account of provisions within their constitutions holding them responsible for providing the needs of their citizens. In addition to that, a democratic leader's position can be contingent upon satisfying these needs in order to preserve the longevity of his regime. These restraints along with many others might hinder a democratic leader from making critical decisions concerning their economy because an error in judgment might jeopardize one's leadership.

With that being stated, the very nature of autocratic regimes allows them to target the issues of their economy more efficiently which can lead to wealth within their economy. However, I think that this only generates wealth and not growth and development within the economy. My reason is that many of these autocratic countries within the MENA region export oil and as a result, many of these countries have generated much wealth on account of this. And because they can exercise economic policies that do not compel them to provide these things known as public goods to citizens (which can be costly), these countries do not have to redistribute the wealth as democracies would have to do. This allows them to keep much of their wealth.

To add, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz tell us that sometimes autocracies use their wealth to buy support or repress domestic unrest. However if the leader is not redistributing the wealth back into his country but rather spending it to preserve his regime with reinforcements and suppressing domestic unrest, then he is not allowing for much growth to occur within his economy. Though fixing market failures can be costly, leaders desire to create economic growth because money is essentially power and as

*The Logic Political Survival* states leaders' main concerns are obtaining power, maintaining it, and maximizing it.

Also, if a leader was to exercise quasi-democratic institutions that advocated for quasi-democratic policies then that might serve as incentive for citizens which can lead to economic growth. Quasi-democratic policies as those previously mentioned can better factors of economic development and because development can serve as investment to better the economy, the economy will exhibit growth. This practice in addition to already being better equipped to target economic failures is why I anticipate autocratic regimes within the MENA region that exercise these institutions will experience growth in their economy and their development.

Geddes states in her article *Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition: A New Data* set that monarchies are the least likely to experience transition or breakdown on account of the power of their leader being inherent. This information leads me to my next hypothesis.

**Hypothesis #2: Absolute monarchies in the MENA region will have lower economic and social development.**

Although I am aware that I have some constitutional monarchies within my study, I anticipate that the absolute monarchies within the MENA region will not be as socially developed or experience as much as economic development as any of the other authoritarian regimes within the MENA region because of their disincentive to implement quasi-democratic policies.

All the power within an absolute monarchy is entrusted in one individual, and this individual can look forward to ruling as long as he lives without much threat of a regime breakdown or transition because the role is inherent. Due to the lack of threats, breakdowns or transitions, the leader does not have an incentive to delegate any powers to other officials such as a prime minister and they can choose to not entrust any power in quasi-democratic institutions such as a council either. All decisions concerning their country's government and economy can flow solely from the leader, an absolute monarch can choose to allow this to remain that way.

Without quasi-democratic institutions there is less advocating for quasi-democratic policies which can mean less economic development and more importantly, less economic growth. In *Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival*, the authors mention that it is more beneficial for authoritarian regimes to be rent-seeking because they will not have to redistribute the wealth throughout their economy if they are exercising this activity. In addition, they also state by not redistributing the wealth back into a country's economy they can choose to invest in things that can preserve their longevity. However, if an authoritarian regime is already one that does not experience much turnover or breakdown because of lack of competition or opposition in the government due to inherent roles, then what incentive does he have to invest in these things at all? From *The Logic of Political Survival*, we learn that once a leader becomes in power, his goal is to maintain his power and maximize it. An absolute monarch has the capability to do just that- stay in power and maximize his power by obtaining all the wealth because money can equal power as well. It is for these reasons that I hypothesize that absolute



monarchies in the MENA region will have poor performances regarding social and economic development.

I would like also like to apply this same concept with my third hypothesis, but in reverse. This leads me to my third hypothesis.

**Hypothesis #3. Authoritarian countries in the MENA region who are resource and labor abundant will be the most developed.**

Because these countries not only have the resources, but also the labor to be economically successful, I anticipate that these countries would be more capable of focusing their efforts on bettering economic development. This development could be represented as countries delegating powers to other officials, allowing for free elections to occur, providing for the general welfare, and as well as other things. As previously mentioned, this can lead to growth within the economy so I anticipate countries of this nature to also be more prone in exercising quasi-democratic policies that allow for growth. My reason being is that because these nations are resource-rich and labor abundant with a liberalized economy, they have all the tools needed for economic development. And because they have the tools to be economically efficient than those countries within the MENA region that are lacking these things, they may also be in a better position to improve their social development due to already being in possession of the tools needed to do so.

## **Chapter Four: Regime, Power, and Level of Authoritarianism Charts**

### **4.1 Regime Chart and Explanation**

In Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz's article *Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition: A New Data Set*, they developed categories (e.g. party, military, etc) in which a country can be classified on account of the qualities exhibited within the regime. However because my sample study observes development over a given time period where transitions can occur, I have performed research to categorize the time periods of each subunit within my study based on the GWF codebook. I have also provided my reasoning for why the authors or I can place them into that category. This serves to identify the types of authoritarian regimes that are presented within my sample.

**Figure 1.** Regime Chart

Countries	Type of Regime w/n MENA Region	OPEC
Algeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Party-military (1963-1992)</li><li>- Military (1993-present)</li></ul>	✓
Bahrain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1971-present)</li></ul>	X
Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1923-1952)</li><li>- Party-Personal-Monarchy (1953-present)</li></ul>	X
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1926- 1979)</li><li>- Personalist ( Theocracy 1980-present )</li></ul>	✓
Iraq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1933-1958)</li><li>- Personal (1959-1963)</li><li>- Personal (1964-1968)</li><li>- Party-personal (1969-1979)</li><li>- Personal (1980-2003)</li><li>- Party (2003)</li></ul>	✓
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Excluded from the Case Study</li></ul>	X
Jordan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1947-present)</li></ul>	X
Kuwait	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1962-present)</li></ul>	✓
Lebanon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Excluded from the Case Study</li></ul>	X
Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1952-1969)</li><li>- Personal (1970- 2014)</li><li>- Undetermined (present)</li></ul>	✓
Morocco	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1957-present)</li></ul>	X
Oman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1742-present)</li></ul>	X
Qatar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Monarchy (1825-present)</li></ul>	✓

**Figure 1. Regime Chart (Continued)**

Saudi Arabia	- Monarchy (1928-present)	✓
Syria	- Oligarchy (1947) - Indirect Military (1950-1951) - Military (1952-1954) - Personal (1958)) - Indirect Military (1963) - Party-personal-military (1964) - Military (1st Ba'ath coup d'etat 1963) - Military (2nd Ba'ath coup d'etat 1966) - Party (Ba'ath Party under Hafez al-Assad,(1970–2000)	X
Tunisia	- Party (1963-present)	X
United Arab Emirates	- Monarchy ( Federation of Monarchies 1972-present)	✓
Yemen	- Monarchy (1919-1962) - Military (1963-1967) - Personal (1968-1974) - Military (1975-1978) - Personal (1979) - Republic (1991) - Military (Coup d'etat 2014-2015)	X

#### **4.1.1 Algeria**

Within the GWF codebook, Algeria is coded as a party-military from years 1963-1992 and as military from 1993 to present-day. GWF defines a party to be a state where leaderships, security, and policy is placed in the hands of a ruling party. In addition to this, the state possesses a large selectorate and small winning coalition, meaning that more people were needed to choose the leader, but less people were involved in helping the incumbent stay in power. As for a military, the codebook actually defines military as an institutionalized military rule that involves consultations within the officer corps and implies constraint by other officers on the dictator, which differs from the definition use to classify a regime as military within the CGV (Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland)

codebook, where a military is defined as autocracies led by men who have ever been officers. Last, but not least, the codebook regards a military as dictators who govern in collaboration with other officers.

The reason why this time period is classified as a party-military within the GWF codebook is that from 1963-1992, the Boumédiène Regime ruled as a unified political body that was predominantly composed of military leaders, but also non-military members that had leadership positions and who were also in power. The political body that the members made up known as the Council of Revolution created a large selectorate being that the body was composed of 26 members. And because they had such a large selectorate, the winning coalition was kept small. The military and non-military leaders served as one under the constitution in 1963 which placed constraints on themselves in ruling individually.

Algeria is regarded as military in 1993 up to present-day because after the Boumédiène Regime, the Algerian Civil War took place and many coup d'états occurred and militias emerged leaving the country under military rule for some time.

#### ***4.1.2 Bahrain***

Bahrain is coded as a monarchy from the year 1971-present which the codebook defines as a political institution where a royal family rules and possesses a small selectorate and a small winning coalition. The royal family that has been in power since 1971 is the Al Khalifa Dynasty and because it is a monarchy, the leadership position is passed down through royal lineage which cuts down the selectorate. In addition, because the family in power will remain in power unless the power is abdicated, there is no need

for a large winning coalition. It is important to keep in mind that although Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy, it is to be considered as an authoritarian monarchy.

#### ***4.1.3 Egypt***

From 1923-1952, Egypt was ruled by the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and because it ruled as a royal family, Egypt during this time period is coded as a monarchy. In 1953, Egypt suffered a coup d'état that was led by Gamal Abdel Nasser who later became the leader of Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser was also a leader with the Baath Socialist Party and implemented their policies while in office. Although Gamal Abdel Nasser was in power, the Muhammad Ali Dynasty was still continued with Fuad II. As a result, Egypt is coded as party-personal-monarchy.

#### ***4.1.4 Iran***

Iran is coded as a monarchy from 1926 until 1979 due to the presence of a royal family (Pahlavi Dynasty) being in power at that time. The power of this ruling family was inherited which concerned less people being involved in electing the leader. On account of the inheritance of power, the successor did not need a large winning coalition due to his leadership being guaranteed. This regime ended in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution which led to instituting Ayatollah Khamenei as leader, shifting the regime from monarchy to theocracy. I categorized the regime of theocracy as a personal regime because the qualities that a theocracy possesses best correlates with what the codebook constitutes as a personal regime. The codebook defines a personal regime as a rule where dictators are not constrained by a strong party or a unified party and that is centered around one individual that holds power. Currently, Iran's regime is led by an individual

who professes to rule in accordance to Islamic principles and values, however he is not constrained to a party and the government is centered around him who holds power. This regime still holds today.

#### ***4.1.5 Iraq***

Iraq is coded as a monarchy from the years of 1933-1958 under the GWF codebook because its government was ruled by the Hashemite Dynasty during this time period. This was until the Hashemite Dynasty was overthrown and former President Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba'i came into power. The GWF codebook codes this reign as personal because the dictator was unconstrained by a party and the politics were centered around one individual who held power. In 1963, a coup d'etat was held and overthrew the presidency of Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba'i leaving Abdul Salam Arif in charge. His rule was also conditioned to be personal because he also did not belong to a party, and all the power of the government rested in his hands. He served until his death in 1966 in which his brother (Abdul Rahman Arif) took his place as president. This rule was also classified as a personal regime.

From 1969-1979, Iraq is classified as party-personal regime. After the government ousted the Abdul Rahman Arif as president, the prime minister Ahmed Hassan al Bakr and the Ba'ath Party took over the Iraqi government. Majority of the power was concentrated in the hands of Ahmed Hassan al Bakr and although he had the influence of the Baath Party, he was not constrained by them. The Baath Party also contributes to Iraq's status of being personal-party because they not only had a hand in

placing Ahmed Hassan al Bakr in power, but they themselves had retained power and had control over certain policies set in place.

That is until in 1980 when Saddam Hussein took the presidency as a result of domestic rest. He ruled until 2003, and the GWF codebook his reign as personal because he although he was influenced by the Baath Party, he was not constrained by the party, and the ruling power was centered and placed in the hands of one individual. His reign would later affect my classification of Iraq as two separate countries (Iraq 2000-2005, Iraq 2005-2010) because under his rule Iraq was more authoritarian. However, after his rule, the Coalition Provisional Authority was established and was in order until elections were held. Because leadership was placed into the hands of a party until a democratically elected government was established, the period after Hussein's reign is classified as party.

#### ***4.1.6 Jordan***

Jordan has been coded as a monarchy because the Hashemite Dynasty has ruled over Jordan since 1947 and are still ruling today. The power is passed down through lineage so there is no need for a larger selectorate or a large winning coalition so long as the power remains in the Hashemite Dynasty. Here the kings hold a wide variety of executive and legislative powers of government and parliament. It is important to keep in mind that although Jordan is a monarchy, it is to be considered as an authoritarian monarchy.

#### ***4.1.7 Kuwait***

Kuwait has been coded as a monarchy because the Al Sabah dynasty has ruled over Kuwait since 1962 after the independence of Kuwait was obtained. However, the monarchy of Kuwait has been classified as a constitutional monarchy with a parliament because there is an Emir as well as a prime minister who serve as heads of state. It is important to note that although Kuwait has a prime minister, the Emir chooses the prime minister and has executive power. Though it is classified as a constitutional monarchy, it is not be mistaken for the constitutional monarchies that are present in England because these constitutional monarchies take on many autocratic qualities as well their heads of state hold much power and possess less constraints than other constitutional monarchies. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power when it comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Kuwait who is a member of OPEC.

#### ***4.1.8 Libya***

Libya is coded as monarchy from the 1952-1969 when it was ruled by the Senussi Dynasty. Afterwards, from 1970-2011, Libya was ruled under Muammar Gaddafi. Because the reign of Gaddafi was not constrained by a strong party or a unified party and the government was centered around Gaddafi who held power, the rule is coded as personal under the GWF codebook. Currently, Libya's government is classified as undetermined because after a reign of 42 years, Gaddafi was overthrown and country has since then experienced coup d'états, but not a definite regime status.

#### ***4.1.9 Morocco***



Morocco has been coded as a monarchy because the Alaouite Dynasty has ruled over the region since 1957. The members of the selectorate are small because so long as the power remains within the family, the next leader will simply inherit his power from his royal family. And because the power is inherited, there is no need for a large winning coalition. It is important to keep in mind that although Morocco is a monarchy, it is to be considered as an authoritarian monarchy.

#### ***4.1.10 Oman***

Oman is coded as a monarchy because the Al Bu Said Dynasty has been in power since 1742. Oman's monarchy is not to be mistaken with other monarchies in Western Europe. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power when it comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Oman who is a member of OPEC.

#### ***4.1.11 Qatar***

Qatar is coded as monarchy because it has been ruled under the reign of the Al Thani Dynasty since 1825. Qatar's monarchy is not to be mistaken with other monarchies in Western Europe. Royal families like these are authoritarian and hold much power when it comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Qatar who is a member of OPEC.

#### ***4.1.12 Saudi Arabia***

Saudi Arabia is classified as a monarchy within the GWF codebook because the Saud Dynasty has ruled in the region since 1928. It is important to understand that although Saudi Arabia is classified as a monarchy, it is not to be considered as of the

same monarchies that are present within other countries. These royal families are authoritarian and hold much power when it comes to their place in government, especially in countries like Saudi Arabia who is a member of OPEC.

#### ***4.1.13 Syria***

Syria is coded as an oligarchy in 1947 because President Shukri Kuwatly was re-elected through election after Syria retain its independence, however not everyone was able to vote in these elections. Syria is then coded during 1950-1951 as an indirect military because the coup d'état led by Hussni al-Zaimy took over, but still allowed for elections to take place for leader though they placed much influence on their preferred candidate. In 1952-1954, the GWF codebook has Syria coded as a military because the coup d'état led by Hussein al-Zaimy was overthrown by a fellow officer known as Adib al-Shishakli and he also ruled with a coup d'etat. In 1958, Syria united Egypt to become the United Arab Republic and under this rule, Gamal Abdel Nasser served as the leader. Because Nasser was not constrained by a political party and the leadership was solely placed in his hands, Syria is coded a personal regime during this time period. Syria experienced a coup d'etat in 1963, but because the leaders still allowed for competitive elections to take place, Syria is coded as an indirect military during this time period. In 1964, Syria was no longer apart of the United Arab Republic, and was now under the National Revolutionary Command which was a militia group that was controlled by the Baáth Party. There was one man by the name of Amin-al-Hafiz that was in control of the militia and the party. Because during this time, Syria had one man in control and he has the influence of the military and a social party, Syria is coded as party-personal-military

in 1963. Syria from 1966-2000 has been coded as military because since Syrian Arab Republic dissolved, Syria has suffered numerous coup d'états.

#### ***4.1.14 Tunisia***

The GWF codebook has categorized Tunisia as a party since 1963-2011. The qualities for coding a regime as a party is the regime needs the leadership, security, and policy duties to be placed in the hands of a ruling party. In 1963, the Constitutional Democratic Rally formerly known as Neo Destour legally declared itself as the ruling party of Tunisia and has ruled as a one-party state since then, but as of 2011 the party has dissolved because of the Tunisian revolution.

#### ***4.1.15 United Arab Emirates***

The GWF codebook codes the United Arab Emirates as a monarchy, but the UAE has a interesting monarchy status because it is a federation made up of by seven royal families (Al Nahyan Dynasty, Al Maktoum Dynasty, Al Qasimi Dynasty, Al Nuaimi Dynasty, Al Mualla Dynasty, and Al Sharqi Dynasty) who have been ruling collectively as a political body since 1972. Although the United Arab Emirates' monarchy is a monarchy made up of seven royal families, it is important to consider that all of these families

hold much power within the UAE government especially since the country is an important member of OPEC.

#### ***4.1.16 Yemen***

The GWF codebook classifies Yemen from 1919-1962 as a monarchy because of the rule of the Mutawakkilite kingdom during that time period. From 1963-1967, Yemen suffered a coup d'etat after the dethroning of Imam Muhammad al-Badr during the North Yemen Civil War. Because the coup d'etat depended on the collaboration of other officers and was led by men who had been officers, this time period is coded as a military. During the years of 1968-1991, Yemen is classified as personalist and military, and the reason being is that the ruling power was placed in the hands of one individual who was Abu Abdullah Saleh and although he was not constrained by a party, he ruled with a group known as the Houthis which was a political armed group. Because this group was once soldiers and they govern in collaboration with other officers, during the years of 1975-1979 as a military. After the South Yemen and North Yemen were unified in 1990, the country was classified as a republic which the GWF codebook does not have a specific category for it to fall under. Last, but not least, the status of Yemen's government has been declared undetermined after the coup d'etat that took place in 2014-2015 which can be classified as military within the GWF codebook.

## **4.2 Who Has Power?**

After identifying the types of authoritarian regimes, I noticed that I had quite a few countries that classified as monarchy, however I was unsure if the level of power remained the same amongst them. As a result, I performed a search to identify the level of power that the leader(s) of each monarchy within my sample study possessed.

Figure 2. Monarchy Power Chart

<b><u>Who Has Power?</u></b>	
Country	Description of Power
Bahrain	King - Legislative Authority  King and Council of Minister - Executive Authority  Conclusion: King possess the most authority
Egypt	President - Executive and Legislative Powers Conclusion: President, but military is quite powerful in this region.
Jordan	King - Retains wide executive and legislative powers of gov and parliament Conclusion: King has the most power
Kuwait	Emir - Chooses the prime minister and Executive Power Prime Minister - Chooses Cabinet National Assembly - Conclusion: Emir has the most power
Morocco	King - Retains less executive power than the prime minister; Honorific Powers; Commander- In-Chief Prime Minister - Executive Powers are Enlarged; Appoint members of Government - Conclusion: King has the most power.
Oman	Sultan - Head of State and Government; functions of the

Figure 2. Monarchy Power Chart (Continued)

Qatar	Emir - Supreme chancellor (Emir) has supreme executive authority; Emir has final say on all matters Conclusion: Emir has the most power
Saudi Arabia	King - King is also the Prime Minister Conclusion: The King has the most power
United Arab Emirates	Emirs - All responsibilities not appointed to the national government are reserved for the emirates - President and Prime Ministership is hereditary Conclusion: Emirates hold the most power.

### **4.3 Level of Authoritarianism**

#### **4.3.1 Level of Authoritarianism Explained**

Following this, I was able to then classify countries as being of high or low authoritarianism. I predicted that the level of authoritarianism would consequently affect how strict or moderate leaders would be with their economic policies and/or how involved they would be in bettering their development. Countries that have been classified as exhibiting a high level of authoritarianism are on account of them not exercising quasi-democratic institutions/ quasi-democratic policies in any form. This indicates that they do not delegate any power to either a council, prime minister, etc., as well as they do not exercise policies that would make them less sovereign to their citizens such as holding elections. Countries that have been identified as exhibiting a low level of authoritarianism are due to either the fact that they do exhibit a federation of powers

between the leader and another party or they practice policies that are quasi-democratic in nature. Though these countries may have a leader that exercises full control in spite of delegating some of his power to other institutions and though they may frame their quasi-democratic policies to go as they anticipate, these countries are not considered of high authoritarianism because they have implemented these forms within their authoritarian regime. Iraq, however being the exception, is classified as both because it contained a time period (2000-2005) where its regime experienced a high level of authoritarianism until a transition occurred within the regime (2005-2010) that later resulted in the exercise of quasi-democratic policies such as elections.

**Figure 3.** Authoritarianism Chart

Authoritarianism Among OPEC and Non-OPEC Members		
Countries	OPEC	Level of Authoritarianism
Algeria	✓	High
Iran	✓	High
Libya	✓	High
Qatar	✓	High
Saudi Arabia	✓	High
Kuwait	✓	Low
United Arab Emirates	✓	Low
Iraq (2000-2005)	✓	High
Iraq (2005-2010)	✓	Low
Oman	X	High
Syria	X	High
Yemen	X	High
Tunisia	X	High
Egypt	X	High
Bahrain	X	Low
Morocco	X	Low
Jordan	X	Low

## **Chapter Five: Data Procedure**

Because my research question involves comparing statistics from other countries within the MENA region to others, my data was gathered from sources that have already collected the information needed such as the World Bank as well as the United Nations Development Programme. Together, these sources provide me information concerning the four variables chosen as measurements of economic development. They are as followed: GDP per capita (PPP), GDP annual growth, life expectancy index, as well as human development index.

GDP per capita (PPP) was selected as a variable because with each of the different countries, they might possess different currencies which might be worth more or less with time. The value of the currencies during a given time period can affect the economy in the long-term which can affect the wealth and potentially the economic development in a country. The data on this variable was generated annually.

In addition to this variable, I thought that it would be important to also look at the annual growth of the GDP per capita. Many of the countries that are within my study export oil and they can gather wealth on account of this, however, with the price of oil, it fluctuates and this can create imbalances with one's economy and/or economic development. To add, part of my study concerns observing how well these regimes can manage their economies during crises as well being able to generate wealth



with and without their main source of income. And with observing the annual growth GDP per capita, I am able to see how well the regimes within these countries are able to do this over time. When assessing whether these two variables were appropriate measurements, I evaluated a study performed by political scientist Robert Barro where he utilized these variables as determinants to measure economic development. In his study, he asserts that at times growth may increase with favorable moments, however the latter effect is weak. Furthermore, this would allow me to see how the economic growth responds with and without these favorable moments (Barro 2003).

While on the subject of economy, it is important to understand that without people, there will be no one there to make an economy work. And with wealth, one needs people to manage it, but there are things that might need to be set in place that ensure that people can be able to do the job. This might be implemented in the form of welfare provisions, healthcare, education, etc. As a result, I need to observe how well these nations decide to approach these issues and whether or not their approach is affecting their economies in a beneficial or harmful way. I decided that the variables of life expectancy index and human development index would be appropriate variables to measure this because it would allow one to observe how well the economy is doing when domestic conditions are well as well as when they are poor. The Human Development Index (HDI) has been considered a fair indicator of development on account of a study conducted by Kemal Dervis and Jeni Klugman, in that it combines the average of income, health, and education of a country. The HDI has been considered a good way to monitor human progress in comparison some studies that solely focus on income.

However, it can be flawed in that it does not consider things such as distribution of income or inequality among the factors it observes (Dervis & Klugman 2011). Last, but not least, LEI was chosen as a fitting indicator for social development on account of a study by Gabriel Gulis who states that measuring life expectancy against different environmental factors allows us to see the overall impact of these variables on the health of the individual (Gulis 1999).

All of the data was observed from the years of 2000-2010. This time period was chosen to give a significant time to observe the influence of the variables, however within a time period that was not too late or during a difficult time period for countries with unusual events such as the Arab Spring. The variables were calculated for each country. Each country was placed in one of the two groups, one being only members of OPEC, and the other of non-OPEC members.

The variables regarding the non-OPEC members were measured first in order to observe how the following variables would affect autocratic countries who were not main exporters of oil. These values were then compiled into a spreadsheet where the total as well as the average of the variables were calculated for each country between the years of 2000-2010 and then combined to calculate the total and average of all the countries within the group during the time period. These recorded values were then tabled to not only give a physical representation of what the data would look like in relation to my hypotheses, but to also individually observe the subunits of my data before t-tests were performed to actually test the significance of my results in relation to my theories.

Within my hypotheses, there are two groups (OPEC and non-OPEC), and there are three comparative groups: high & low authoritarianism, absolute monarchies & non-absolute monarchies, and RRLAs (resource-rich, labor abundant) and non-RRLAs). The difference of means was determined for each of comparative groups for each variable within both groups. Afterwards, the mean for each country within that group was combined into a spreadsheet and a t-test was performed. This was done for each variable.

To add to this, additional information was gathered from a variety of sources that involved the regime transitions, regime background, and the regime occupied during a given time within these countries which was later charted. The charts also included who possessed power within these regimes (because explicit roles of power were not known prior) as well as how much power they had. This later acted as another potential explanation for why the data observed from the variables reflected or did not reflect the level of economic/social development shown for these countries.

## **Chapter Six: Data**

### **6.1.1 GDP per capita (PPP) for non-OPEC members**

The first variable I regarded was the GDP per capita (PPP) for each country. With the GDP per capita (PPP) of the non-OPEC members, my data displays that only two countries were capable of performing at or above the average GDP per capita PPP calculated for the non-OPEC members and they were Oman and Bahrain, Oman being of high authoritarianism and Bahrain being of low authoritarianism. Only one of the countries, Bahrain, was known for being a main exporter of oil. Though Oman has some oil resources, it could not be considered an oil-rich country to where its wealth can solely be based its GDP per capita (PPP) of its export. The remaining countries performed below the average mean of GDP per capita (PPP).

**Figure 4.** Data for Non-OPEC Members GDP per capita (PPP) 2000-2010

		Non-OPEC Members	GDP per capita PPP 2000-2010 (International \$)	
		Low	OPEC Avg GDP per capita PPP 2000-2010	High
Level of Authoritarian Governments			17,421.01	
High	Oman			\$43,634.53
	Syria	(Excluded)		
	Yemen	\$4,121.70		
	Tunisia	\$8,930.07		
	Egypt	\$8,350.39		
Low	Bahrain			\$42,786.90
	Morocco	\$5,467.33		
	Jordan	\$8,656.14		

Unfortunately, I was not able to generate information about Syria's GDP per capita (PPP) from the World Bank. Perhaps the lack of information could be on account of an error contributed by the source or that the country's economy experienced difficulty on account of the regime transitions and leadership turnover which can be inferred from regime charts. Moreover, the absence of information from Syria has compromised my data, therefore my sample regarding economic development within this dataset does not reflect an accurate representation of the average GDP per capita PPP for this particular group.

Regarding Hypothesis 1, the data concerning this variable was not as supportive as anticipated. Bahrain was the only country exercising quasi-democratic institutions that performed above the average mean GDP per capita (PPP) for non-OPEC members. I revisited my chart that discussed the level of power within monarchies to observe whether if it was due to the fact that Bahrain had more quasi-democratic institutions than the other two countries. On the contrary, my chart displayed that Morocco had more limitations set forth by its quasi-democratic institutions than Bahrain or Jordan. I also researched additional information to observe whether any of these countries exported oil and found that only Bahrain was known for exporting oil (Sullivan 2013). Jordan and Morocco do not export oil, however Morocco is known for having a high non-oil GDP within the regions (World Bank 2019). Although the data displayed did not seem supportive of the first hypothesis, this information only considers one of the two variables mentioned in Hypothesis 1. To add, there were two other variables that were being observed to measure the development part of Hypothesis 1.

Concerning Hypothesis 2, my data was also not supportive of my theory. My hypothesis stated that absolute monarchies in the MENA region will have lower economic and social development. The only country within the data set of the non-OPEC members that could be classified as an absolute monarchy was Oman, and with this factor of economic development, Oman performed well above the expected mean. As previously mentioned, Oman does not have many oil resources to be considered oil-rich. However, in comparison to some other countries within this dataset such as Jordan or Yemen, who have small reserves or little to no oil resources, it has significantly more which could have a role in its GDP (Said 2015). To reiterate, this is one of the first factors observed, therefore it is too early to declare the data regarding this hypothesis to be insignificant.

Hypothesis 3 was not supported either. My hypothesis stated that authoritarian countries in the MENA region who are resource and labor abundant that are also quasi-democratic/have some open institutions will be the most developed. There were only two countries within this data set of non-OPEC members that classify as RRLA and they were Syria and Yemen. I didn't have data for Syria which serves as a disadvantage in this matter, however I did have data on Yemen. Yemen actually possessed the lowest GDP per capita of all the countries within this particular data set. From the regime charts, I inferred that Yemen has faced some discrepancies within its regime transitions which could have influenced the data concerning its economy.

### **6.1.2 GDP per capita (PPP) for OPEC members**

After observing the GDP per capita (PPP) with the non-OPEC members, I observed them with the members of OPEC. These countries were known as major exporters of oil. Three countries in this data set performed above the mean GDP per capita (PPP) that was measured to be performed by all of countries. Two of these countries (Kuwait and UAE) were of low authoritarianism due to the presence of quasi-democratic institutions, and one was of high authoritarianism (Qatar).

**Figure 5.** Data for OPEC Members GDP per capita (PPP) 2000-2010

		OPEC Members	GDP per capita PPP 2000-2010 (International \$)	
		Low	OPEC Avg GDP per capita PPP 2000-2010	High
Level of Authoritarian Governments			\$44,741.41	
High	Algeria	\$11,826.99		
	Iran	\$15,600.05		
	Libya	\$25,404.41		
	Qatar			\$114,565.05
	Saudi Arabia	\$43,931.96		
	Iraq (2000-2005)	\$10,663.58		
Low	Kuwait			\$83,019.36
	United Arab Emirates			\$85,558.69
	Iraq 2005-2010	\$12,102.64		

My data collected from this data set was more supportive of Hypothesis 1 in that almost all the countries that were considered to be of low authoritarianism experienced

greater economic development than those who did not, with Iraq and Qatar as outliers. Even Saudi Arabia was quite close to the overall average for members of OPEC.

With Hypothesis 2, I only had two countries that could constitute as an absolute monarchy and that was Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The information presented on this variable only addressed the economic development and not the social development factor because the other social variables were to be measured after. However as far as economic development, my prediction did not prove to have any validity. Qatar in fact had the highest of GDP per capita (PPP) and Saudi Arabia though it did not reach the mean, did not have the lowest. I gathered additional information to identify if this was on account of Qatar being the largest exporter of oil within OPEC, however what I found was that Saudi Arabia is actually the largest oil exporter in OPEC (Blas, Davis 2018).

Hypothesis 3 anticipated that countries who were resource and labor abundant would be the most economically developed. Of this data set, those countries were Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. None of these countries were capable of meeting the average mean expected for all the countries within this data set, let alone half of it. All nations except Iraq (2005-2010) were countries that were not classified of exercising quasi-democratic institutions which could have served as a disadvantage with their economic policies. Another potential explanation could be that countries such as Libya and Iraq have experienced either international or domestic conflict during this time period which is expressed within my regime charts.

### **6.2.1 GDP Annual Growth for Non-OPEC Members**



After analyzing the GDP per capita (PPP), I examined the variable of GDP Annual Growth. The reason being is that I wanted to observe whether the decrease or increase in GDP per capita (PPP) would lead to more or less growth in GDP per capita overall. To add, this variable is also a stronger indicator to measure economic development in these countries because it is able to depict how well an economy does in spite of its possession or non-possession of oil.

**Figure 6.** Data for Non-OPEC Members GDP Annual Growth 2000-2010

		Non-OPEC Members GDP Annual Growth		
		Low	Non OPEC Avg GDP Annual Growth 2000-2010	High
Level of Authoritarian Governments			4.78	
High	Oman	3.51		
	Syria		4.78	
	Yemen	4.45		
	Tunisia	4.27		
Low	Egypt			5
	Bahrain			5.37
	Morocco	4.69		
	Jordan			6.13

The anticipated average GDP Annual Growth for the non-OPEC members was expected to be 4.78. My data reflected that only four countries (Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and Jordan) within this data set performed either at or above the expected mean, half being completely authoritarian and the other half being quasi-democratic. Two of the four countries (Syria and Bahrain) were known for their exports of oil and the remaining two (Egypt and Jordan) had very little resources of oil yet experienced approximately the same and at times more GDP growth than the other two countries.

The recorded data seemed to support Hypothesis 1 with this variable. Both of the countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions within their regimes experienced higher economic growth than their counterparts. Bahrain was the only country that was a large exporter of oil out of the two. I performed additional research to assess what might have contributed to Jordan's economic growth because Bahrain and Jordan's leaders more or less exercised the same amount of quasi-democratic power. I observed that Jordan had main exports of textiles, phosphates, etc that could contribute to its GDP annual growth (Trading Economics 2019). After reviewing the data from this variable and the previous variable, I was given the impression that this sample would be regarded as insignificant in that there was not consistent pattern with the authoritarian countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions showing greater economic growth, however this only applied to the economic part of my hypothesis and not the social development part.

Concerning Hypothesis 2, my theory was also supported. There was only one absolute monarchy within this data set (Oman), and it retained the lowest GDP annual growth out of all the other countries. With the results collected from this variable and the previous variable, my results for this hypothesis could also be regarded as insignificant because a clear correlation between the two variables was not established with this sample. Though the data from both of the economic variables served as insubstantial evidence of my theory because the data reported the absolute monarchies having high and low levels of economic development with the variables, I still observed the social factors before regarding the whole theory as proven to be untrue.

Unfortunately, Hypothesis 3 was not backed by the information recorded. Though Syria and Yemen did not perform the lowest, they either performed at or below the mean for GDP annual growth. The data collected from this measurement along with the previous variable began to reflect an early projection that the entire hypothesis was proving to be invalid. The reason being is that hypothesis states that countries that are RRLAs will be the most developed but both variables observed reflect that they are not economically developed and in order to be the most developed, they would have to be the most developed economically as well as socially. Contrary to this, I still observed the other variables of social development to see if these countries performed better with social/human development rather than economic.

#### **6.2.2 GDP Annual Growth for OPEC members**

I then moved on to the GDP Annual Growth for the members of OPEC. Unfortunately during the years of 2000-2010, there were only two OPEC members that performed at or above the expected mean of annual growth for this data set and those countries were Qatar and Iraq (2005-2010). Because Qatar is a member of OPEC, it can be inferred that much of its wealth has been on account of its production of oil, however I did some additional research to reveal how important its reserves are. I discovered that Qatar has one of the largest oil reserves in the world, therefore it has much of its wealth on account of its export (Dillinger 2015). As for Iraq, it's wealth can not only be attributed to the fact that it possess the fifth largest oil reserves in the world, but also because it also endured a regime transition during this time period which could have stimulated its economy by liberating it.

**Figure 7.** Data for OPEC Members GDP Annual Growth 2000-2010

		OPEC Members Annual Growth		
		Low	OPEC Avg Annual Growth 2000-2010	High
Level of Authoritarian Governments			5.47	
High	Algeria	3.87		
	Iran	4.58		
	Libya	4.55		
	Qatar			13.49
	Saudi Arabia	3.66		
	Iraq (2000-2005)	3.71		
Low	Kuwait	4.85		
	United Arab Emirates	4.59		
	Iraq (2005-2010)			5.91

Regarding Hypothesis 1, the data accommodated my anticipations regarding authoritarian regimes that possessed quasi-democratic institutions. Although only one of the quasi-democratic authoritarian regimes experienced growth at or above the expected average, all of them experienced more annual growth than those that exercised a high level of authoritarianism with the exception of Qatar. Considering the results reported for the variable of GDP per capita (PPP) as well as those represented with this variable, I inferred that to some extent authoritarian regimes that exercise quasi-democratic institutions will experience higher economic development than those that do not. But before anticipating that the testing on this hypothesis would render true, I also observed the social development variables as well.

On account of Qatar experiencing the highest annual growth and Saudi Arabia exhibiting the lowest, the data was not in favor of Hypothesis 2. Not only did Qatar performed at or above the average, but it also surpassed the mean by twice as much as I measured it to be. Again, as previously mentioned, Qatar does have one of the largest oil reserves in world, however Saudi Arabia has the largest within the data set and its annual

growth was not even close to that of Qatar's (Dillinger 2019). It can also be inferred that there are other factors besides its main export of oil contributing to its annual growth. With the results reported from GDP Annual Growth variable and as well the GDP per capita (PPP) variable, I predicted that the t-test regarding absolute monarchies experiencing lower economic development would not prove to be valid with the data observed.

Finally, the results involving this variable were not backed by Hypothesis 3. In fact, only one of these countries (Iraq 2005-2010) met and performed above the anticipated mean. After observing the GDP per capita and the annual growth of these countries, I predicted that the data regarding this hypothesis would not be valid. My hypothesis stated that these countries would be the most developed and based off my variables that would mean economically and socially. However, though the data proves that these countries are not the most developed economically, it does not indicate that they will not be the most developed socially. It simply conveys that this hypothesis cannot be proven true overall, therefore I continued my observance of this data set with the social development variables.

#### **6.3.1 Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for Non-OPEC Members**

After observing the economic development variables, I observed the social development variables. I first began with observing the Life Expectancy Index (LEI), and my reason for observing this variable first is that I wanted to observe how the economic policies would affect a country's population with a direct relationship before viewing it from a holistic view.

**Figure 8.** Data for Non-OPEC Members LEI 2000-2010

		Non-OPEC Members Life Expectancy Index			
			Low	Non-OPEC Avg LEI 2000-2010	High
Level of Authoritarian Governments				0.79	
High	Oman				0.83
	Syria				0.83
	Yemen		0.65		
	Tunisia				0.83
Low	Egypt		0.76		
	Bahrain				0.85
	Morocco			0.79	
	Jordan				0.81

My results from this subset did not appear to be significant concerning this variable and Hypothesis 1. Although all autocratic countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions within this dataset performed at or above the average LEI, almost all of those countries who exercised a high level of authoritarianism did as well. As far as the second prediction of Hypothesis 1, determining whether or not those that exercise quasi-democratic institutions have more social development than those that do not, my data does not provide any indication that this is true.

The data did not seem to defend the assumptions of Hypothesis 2. Oman did not experience a lower level of social development that I anticipated. In fact, Oman experienced one of the highest LEI observed within the data set. It is to be considered that Oman is highly authoritarian, but also to some extent Oman was still able to maintain a high LEI regardless of its stance on quasi-democratic institutions. Though I still had one more variable to observe before concluding my suspicions that the hypothesis would not matter with this subset, the data previously observed leaned more towards it not being applicable.

The data surrounding my Hypothesis 3 was not very indicative of my theorems. With the previously variables, I observed that they were not the most economically developed, however with this data I noticed that the RRLAs were just as socially developed as the countries that are non-RRLAs. Oman and Tunisia experienced the same LEI as Syria and Yemen who were RRLAs and Bahrain even surpassed the LEI of these two countries.

### **6.3.2 Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for OPEC Members**

More than half the samples within this data set performed at or above the LEI, and those that did not were relatively close to meeting the average LEI expected for this data set.

**Figure 9.** Data for OPEC Members LEI 2000-2010

		OPEC Members Life Expectancy Index			
		Low	OPEC Avg LEI 2000-2010	High	
Level of Authoritarian Governments			0.81		
High	Algeria		0.81		
	Iran	0.8			
	Libya	0.79			
	Qatar			0.87	
	Saudi Arabia			0.82	
	Iraq (2000-2005)	0.75			
Low	Kuwait			0.82	
	United Arab Emirates			0.85	
	Iraq (2005-2010)	0.74			

Hypothesis 1 could be considered plausible based on the data provided from this sample. Almost all of the countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions

performed above the expected average LEI except for Iraq (2005-2010). After observing the economic development variables in addition to this social development variable, I can infer that countries exercising quasi-democratic can experience more social and economic development.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia performed above the mean, with Qatar obtaining the highest of the data set. Albeit that I still had to observe the HDI variable to suspect that the evidence would not substantially support my hypothesis, the data gathered so far from the three variables has been in favor of the theory not being viable.

Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Out of all the RRLAs, only one performed at or above the average LEI for this set and that country was Algeria. Most of the RRLAS actually retained some of the lowest LEI of all the units within the group. Previously I deduced that the RRLAs would probably not be the most developed economically, and it is proving to be the least socially developed. However I still had one more variable to observe before assuming my hypothesis would be rejected completely with the t-testing.

#### **6.4.1 Human Development Index (HDI) for Non-OPEC Members**

Finally, my last variable of the Human Development Index (HDI) was observed. This variable was comprised of numerous indicators of human development such as the life expectancy index, education index, and gross national income per capita to provide a more holistic view of how the type of regime a country possesses can affect its economic policies as well as how those policies can affect the social and economic development of a country.



**Figure 10.** Data for Non-OPEC Member HDI 2000-2010

		Non-OPEC Members Human Development Index			
		Low	Non-OPEC Avg HDI 2000-2010		High
Level of Authoritarian Governments			0.66		
High	Oman				0.75
	Syria	0.63			
	Yemen	0.47			
	Tunisia				0.63
	Egypt	0.64			
Low	Bahrain				0.73
	Morocco	0.58			
	Jordan				0.72

Hypothesis 1 was not strongly supported by the data. Those that exercised quasi-democratic institutions as well as those who did not exercise quasi-democratic institutions had the same amount of countries to obtain an HDI index at or above the expected HDI for this dataset. After gathering all the information from the variables, I presumed that the data of all the variables observed and the countries that exercised quasi-democratic institutions would not be of importance. There was not a consistent pattern within the data set to infer that there was any correlation between authoritarian regimes that exercised quasi-democratic institutions producing high levels of economic growth and social development.

Following Hypothesis 2, my results did not support my theory. Oman, the absolute monarchy of this data set, retained the highest of HDI of all the subset units within this sample. Through all the variables measured, Oman has more or less shown a consistent pattern of obtaining high economic growth and social development aside from the results recorded with the variable of GDP Annual Growth. I gathered that my theory regarding absolute monarchies experiencing lower economic and social development within this data set would not justifiable by my data.

To conclude this variable, my data did not support Hypothesis 3. The two RRLAs within my data set, Syria and Yemen, obtained the two of the lowest HDI presented within the data. With all of the variables accounted for, my theory seemed to not be backed by the data I gathered.

#### **6.4.2 Human Development Index (HDI) for OPEC Members**

Lastly, I observed my last variable of the OPEC member data set. My data reflected that half of the members within the data set performed at or above the expected average HDI, most of these members were those that exercised a lower level of authoritarianism.

**Figure 11.**Data for OPEC Members HDI 2000-2010

		Human Development Index OPEC Members			
		Low	OPEC Avg HDI 2000-2010	High	
Level of Authoritarian Governments			0.73		
High	Algeria	0.89			
	Iran	0.71			
	Libya			0.75	
	Qatar			0.81	
	Saudi Arabia			0.77	
Low	Iraq (2001-2005)	0.62			
	Kuwait			0.79	
	United Arab Emirates			0.83	
	Iraq (2005-2010)	0.64			

Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data provided. Almost all of the low authoritarian regimes within this data set experienced high levels of HDI aside from Iraq (2005-2010). Again, Iraq did undergo a regime transition in this duration which might have affected its economic and social development as a whole (Crichton, et al. 2010).

Overall, my data could be considered insubstantial in comparison to the data recorded from the other the variables because there was not a consistent pattern established that could prove this to be true.

My second hypothesis is anticipated to be proven false. Qatar performed at or above the expected average for all the variables and Saudi Arabia, though in many categories performed low, did not consistently perform as the lowest. As a result, it showed signs that the hypothesis was not be validated with either of the data sets.

To conclude, Hypothesis 3 was not supported by this data. There was only one RRLA that performed at or above the anticipated mean for this variable and that was Libya. After observing all the data, I judged that the hypothesis for these data sets would be irrelevant. There was not a consistent correlation between the RRLAs being the most socially or economically developed so this hypothesis seems not applicable for these countries.

## **Chapter Seven: T-Tests**

### **T-Test Analysis**

After viewing a breakdown of the data, I was not only able to make inferences based on each country's individual performance, but also I was able to see how they would be accounted for in the hypothesis testing. First, the difference of means was calculated for the three comparative groups (high & low authoritarianism, absolute monarchies and non-absolute monarchies, and RRLAs and non-RRLAs) among OPEC and non-OPEC members. Afterwards, the p-value was then calculated for each comparative group in

relation to each variable. This was also done for both non-OPEC members and OPEC members. The recorded p-value identified how significant the difference of means was in relation to the null hypothesis. If the p-value was greater than that of .05, then the evidence was not significant enough to reject my hypothesis. However, if the p-value was less than 0.5, the evidence was significant enough to reject the null and accept the alternative hypothesis. Any value that was less than .10, but greater

than .05 was considered almost significant, but not enough to reject the null hypothesis. To add, instead of including the actual numerical values, I represented the value as \*p < 0.01, p > .05, and so on, with the number of asterisks in front of the "p" represents the increasing significance of the data.

### **GDP per capita for non-OPEC members**

With the GDP per capita of the non-OPEC members, the first comparative group of high and low authoritarianism had a p-value that was less than .05 which proved to be significant enough to reject Hypothesis 1. This rejection resulted in accepting the alternative hypothesis that considers countries that are more authoritarian will experience more growth and development. The remaining comparative groups were quite significant in that they both contain values that were less than 0.01, therefore my hypothesis was proven false, making the alternative hypothesis of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 to be true. Concerning the OPEC members of this variable, all of them experienced a p-value that was of \*\*\*p < 0.01 which provided enough evidence for all of my hypotheses concerning this variable to be proven untrue.

**Figure 12:** T-Tests Results

	Non-OPEC GDP per capita				OPEC GDP per capita		
High Authoritarianism	16,259.17			High Authoritarianism	36,998.67		
Low Authoritarianism	18,970.12			Low Authoritarianism	60,226.90		
Difference of Means	-2,710.95	P-Value	0.48	Difference of Means	-23,228.23	P-Value	0
Absolute Monarchies	43,634.53			Absolute Monarchies	79,248.51		
Non-Absolute Monarchies	13,052.09			Non-Absolute Monarchies	34,882.25		
Difference of Means	30,582.44	P-Value	0	Difference of Means	44,366.26	P-Value	0
RRLAs	4,121.70			RRLAs	15,119.53		
Non-RRLAs	19,637.56			Non-RRLAs	81,768.77		
Difference of Means	-15,515.86	P-Value	0	Difference of Means	-66,649.24	P-Value	0
	Non-OPEC GDP Annual Growth				OPEC GDP Annual Growth		
High Authoritarianism	4.41			High Authoritarianism	5.64		
Low Authoritarianism	5.39			Low Authoritarianism	5.11		
Difference of Means	-0.98	P-Value	0.027	Difference of Means	0.53	P-Value	0.65
Absolute Monarchies	3.53			Absolute Monarchies	8.58		
Non-Absolute Monarchies	4.95			Non-Absolute Monarchies	4.58		
Difference of Means	-1.42	P-Value	0.18	Difference of Means	4.00	P-Value	0.068
RRLAs	4.62			RRLAs	4.52		
Non-RRLAs	4.83			Non-RRLAs	6.64		
Difference of Means	-0.21	P-Value	0.61	Difference of Means	-2.12	P-Value	0.27
	Non-OPEC Life Expectancy Index				OPEC Life Expectancy Index		
High Authoritarianism	0.78			High Authoritarianism	0.81		
Low Authoritarianism	0.82			Low Authoritarianism	0.8		
Difference of Means	-0.04	P-Value	0	Difference of Means	0.01	P-Value	0.32
Absolute Monarchies	0.83			Absolute Monarchies	0.85		

Non-Absolute Monarchies	0.79			Non-Absolute Monarchies	0.79		
Difference of Means	0.04	P-Value	**p < 0.01	Difference of Means	0.06	P-Value	**p < 0.01
RRLAs	0.74			RRLAs	0.78		
Non-RRLAs	0.81			Non-RRLAs	0.84		
Difference of Means	-0.07	P-Value	**p < 0.01	Difference of Means	-0.06	P-Value	**p < 0.01
	Non-OPEC Human Development Index				OPEC Human Development Index		
High Authoritarianism	0.64			High Authoritarianism	0.73		
Low Authoritarianism	0.7			Low Authoritarianism	0.75		
Difference of Means	-0.06	P-Value	**p < 0.01	Difference of Means	-0.02	P-Value	*p < 0.05
Absolute Monarchies	0.75			Absolute Monarchies	0.8		
Non-Absolute Monarchies	0.65			Non-Absolute Monarchies	0.72		
Difference of Means	0.1	P-Value	**p < 0.01	Difference of Means	0.08	P-Value	**p < 0.01
RRLAs	0.55			RRLAs	0.68		
Non-RRLAs	0.7			Non-RRLAs	0.8		
Difference of Means	-0.15	P-Value	**p < 0.01	Difference of Means	-0.12	P-Value	**p < 0.01

## GDP Annual Growth

The comparative group of high and low authoritarianism with non-OPEC members contained the only p-value that was significant enough for me to reject a null hypothesis. The other comparative groups contained values that were greater than 0.05, therefore Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 still stand with this variable. With the annual growth of OPEC members, the comparative groups all experienced a p-value that was greater than .05 which resulted in all three hypotheses to still hold validity because there was insufficient evidence to disprove them.

### **Life Expectancy Index**

All theories were rejected with this variable amongst the non-OPEC members. Each pair of the three comparative groups expressed the same p-value of  $p < .01$  which is quite significant to reject the null hypotheses. As a result, my alternative hypotheses for all three must be accepted. As far as the OPEC members performance with this variable, only the comparative group of high and low authoritarianism was not significant enough to invalidate. Aside from this comparative group, the remaining two experienced a p-value that was more than enough to reject Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.

### **Human Development Index**

Last, but not least, I found that Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 were rejected with the non-OPEC members involving this variable because they all expressed a p-value of  $**p < 0.01$  which is more than significant to disprove my three theories. As for the OPEC members regarding this variable, all of the p-values resulted in the rejection of Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 with the latter two comparative groups containing more evidence to reject their hypothesis than the first comparative group.



## **Chapter Eight: Conclusions**

In conclusion, the assumptions that I had made observing each country's individual performance did not support the results expressed in the testing of my hypotheses. In fact, almost all of my hypotheses were rejected with the four variables, aside from the variable of GDP Annual Growth where there was not enough evidence to disprove Hypothesis 2 and 3. But how can this be?

In the beginning, I made the assertion that not much is known about these regimes and that their nature differs from others within these regions. This means that with each nation circumstances are different, resources vary, and results produce different effects. While some countries such as Qatar and Oman continued to thrive without exhibiting much change to the power of their regime, others countries such as Iraq made changes to their regime. But because the nations in themselves have also endured hardship or have just simply made bad investments, they do not experience the same success.

This leads me to a few considerations to note when observing the progression of these countries in the future. First, the presence or absence of certain institutions in itself is not enough to control the overall level of social and economic development. I had some countries within my datasets that were highly authoritarian such as Qatar and Oman who exhibited high performances, and some countries that were of low authoritarianism such as Bahrain and Kuwait that did just as well regardless of the difference.

Secondly, just because a country has the resources and the labor to fuel its economy does not indicate that it necessary has the tools for success. For example, quite

a few countries were considered to be RRLAs, but that did not necessarily indicate that they knew how to manage their resources. To add, many of these countries endured domestic or international conflict during this time, so even if they knew how to manage these things, circumstances could be prove different when undergoing a crisis. And last, but not least on this matter, possessing these tools does not necessarily place a country in good standing to compete economically/socially with countries that experience great wealth from exports/resources such as oil which they may not have.

My third and final note is that each country should be treated with a case-by-case approach. Many countries within my study responded differently with the presence or absence of conflict, resources, transitions etc., which was later expressed within their economic/social development. And because they counter each matter differently, an approach that anticipates to be the remedy for all countries in these regions for example democracy or my approach of an equipped quasi-democracy would not likely be the answer for at least some of them.

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